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tributee has as such no interest, estate or rights in the property which
he may subsequently inherit.5 The husband made a voluntary legacy
to his wife, despite her waiver. If the obligation of the waiver suf-
fered impairment it was only because he exercised further testamen-
tary privileges with a condition attached and thereby brought those
consequences unwittingly or intentionally upon himself or his estate. 6
The state could have given the right of election to a spouse regardless
of a waiver, or it could condition recognition upon acknowledgment as
a desirable safeguard. 7 In states in which the subject of descent and
distribution is covered by statute, it is generally declared that the
right to take by descent, or inherit, is wholly the creature of, and
regulated by, statute." The right has been granted by law out of con-
sideration of public policy.9 The right to take property by descent
has been held or declared to be a mere creature of the law and not a
natural right.10
E.F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STERILIZATION.-X was imprisoned at
the Oklahoma State Penitentiary for his participation in an armed
robbery. He had once before been sentenced for such a crime and
had also been convicted for the theft of chickens. These crimes, all
being felonies, the Attorney General of the state, acting under the
provisions of the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,' passed subse-
quent to the commission of the third conviction, brought proceedings
to obtain a judgment to render the felon sterile. Section 195 2 spe-
cifically exempts embezzlers although embezzlement has been defined
as a felony by statute in Oklahoma." Though the petitioner was
5 Newman v. Dore, 250 App. Div. 708, 294 N. Y. Supp. 499, aff'd, 275
N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 112 A. L. R. 643 (1937).
6 Compare with Restatement of Law of Contracts § 45, "A duty under a
unilateral or independent contractual obligation is discharged by a manifestation
by the obligee to the obligor at or before the time when performance is due of
unwillingness to receive the performance when due or of assent to its omission,
if the manifestation is not withdrawn before the expiration of a reasonable time
after performance becomes due."
7 See supra note 1.
8 Jones v. Jones, 234 U. S. 615, 34 Sup. Ct 937 (1914).
9 Stone v. Elliott, 182 Ind. 454, 101 N. E. 309 (1913).
10 Magoun v. Illinois Trust etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594(1898) ; Dawson v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch 321, 2 L. ed. 634 (U. S. 1808).
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171 et seq.; L. 1935, pp. 94 et seq (A habitual
criminal is a person who having been convicted two or more times for crimes
amounting to felonies . . . is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Okla-
homa).
2 Ibid.
a OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1704.
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RECENT DECISIONS
given notice and right to defend, the jury's finding of fact was limited
to whether the operation could be performed without injury. No
opportunity was given the appellant to disprove the presumption that
the child of a habitual criminal would have criminal tendencies. The
Oklahoma court in upholding the presumption 4 defied the findings of
learned medical authorities.5 On certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, held, an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Skinner v.
Oklahon ex rel. Williamson, 315 U. S. 789 (1942).
Early statutes which provided for the sterilization of the feeble-
minded, insane, and epileptic inmates of state institutions and failed to
provide similar treatment for those similarly afflicted and not in state
institutions were declared unconstitutional as denying equal protection
of the laws. 6 Apparently irreconcilable are recent decisions holding
such enactments reasonable use of the police power in protecting the
health, morals, and safety of the community where it has been defi-
nitely proven that the traits will in all.probability be inherited.7 How-
ever, arbitrary rulings which would make sterilization mandatory for
felons performing particular crimes and specifically exempting felons
committing offenses of the same degree are void as denial of equal
protection.8 Where the statute provided ample notice by personal
service, regular proceedings, opportunity to defend, and the right to
appeal it has been held to have complied with the terms of the "due
process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 An act giving no
opportunity to cross-examine the board experts who decided upon the
operation, to controvert their opinion, or to establish that he was not
in the class designated by the act was declared void for lack of due
process.' 0 The operation of vasectomy is not held to be cruel and
unusual punishment, -within the meaning of the Federal Constitution,
where the purpose of the act is not punitive, but has for its aim the
well being of the community by reason of the ultimate eradication of
4 Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123(1941).
r 1 AM. J. MEi. Jua. 253, 255 (1918) (American Neurological Association
is opposed to sterilization of criminals, there being no way whatever of pre-
dicting the occurrence of this type of character . . . human character is too
complex a reaction to be resolved eugenically by any genetic knowledge which
we have at the present time).
6 Osborn v. Thomson, 169 N. Y. Supp. 639, 103 Misc. 23 (1918); Haynes
v. Lapier, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938 (1918) ; Smith v. Board of Examiners,
85 N. J. L. 46, 88 At. 963 (1913).
7 State ex rel. Smith, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1929) ; Davis, Warden v.
Walton, 74 Utah 60, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).8 See University of Maryland v Murry (Pearson v. Murry), 169 Md. 478,
182 At. 590 (1935).
9 Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516 (1925).
20 Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921).
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degeneracy." Because such a statute is not a criminal act its pass-
age after the commission of the crime is not ex post facto legislation.12
M. J. S.
LABOR UNIONS-LIBEL-LIABILITY OF NEWSPAPER FOR LIBEL-
ING UNION.-The plaintiff, Kirkman, president of Local Union Num-
ber 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, brought
a libel action in the union's behalf, as well as his own against a news-
paper and a newspaper syndicate. The defendant published an article
denouncing the union officials, charging that they were demanding
exorbitant initiation fees from their new members. The publication
did not tend to discredit any particular member of the union but
tended to injure the union as a whole. The defendant moved to dis-
miss the case as insufficient in law. The lower court denied the
motion and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, held that the plaintiff
as resident of the union may maintain an action in behalf of the union
as well as for himself. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspaper, Inc., 287
N. Y. 373, 39 N. E. (2d) 206 (1942).
Prior to this decision, unions and other incorporated associations
could not sue for libel or slander; ' nor could any member of the union
sue on his own behalf, unless he could prove that he personally was
injured.2 It is usually difficult for an individual member to prove
damages 8 for the courts have held that the libelous statements made
against the union were not the concern of the member 4 and that the
member of a union did not have any property interest in the reputa-
tion of the union." Non-profit corporations were permitted to sue for
the torts of libel or slander in New York since the middle of the
nineteenth century. 6
1 Davis, Warden v. Walton, 74 Utah 60, 276 Pac. 921 (1929); Buck v.
Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516 (1925) ; State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac.
75 (1912). But see Aranoff, Constitutionality of Asexualization in the United
States (1927) 1 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 146, 158.
121, re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492 (1912).
1 Giraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith 337 (Ct. Com. P1. N. Y. 1854).
2 Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93, 200 N. E. 596 (1936) ; Owen v. Clark, 154
Okla. 108, 6 P. (2d) 755 (1931).
3 Trenton Mutual Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402 (1852)';
Thomas v. Moore, [1918] 1 K. B. 555.
4 Stone, Treas. v. Textile Examiner's Ass'n, 137 App. Div. 655, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1910) ; SEELMAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 88.
5 Hays v. American Defense Soc., 252 N. Y. 266, 169 N. E. 380 (1929).
6 Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452 (1853); Electrical Board of Trade v.
Sheehan, 214 App. Div. 712, 210 N. Y. Supp. 127 (1st Dep't 1925) ; Peacoch v.
Tata Sons, 206 App. Div. 145, 200 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1st Dep't 1923); The
Shoe and Leather Bank v. John Thompson, 23 How. Pr. 253 (N. Y. 1863);
Vagel v. Bushnell, 203 Mo. App. 623, 221 S. W. 819 (1920).
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